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#### Topical affirmatives must expand ECONOMIC ties toward the target country—

Celik ‘11. Arda Can Celik. MA Politics & Intl Studies, Uppsala University. “Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies.” Pg. 11

Introduction Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the target state. Engagement policies differ from other tools in Economic Diplomacy. They target to deepen the economic relations to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender stale to change the political behaviour of target stale. However they cannot be counted as carrots or inducement tools, they focus on long term strategic goals and they are not restricted with short term policy changes.(Kahler&Kastner,2006) They can be unconditional and focus on creating greater economic benefits for both parties. Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and non militarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway lo perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as follows "It is a policy of deliberate expanding economic ties with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations ".(p523-abstact). It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance (1977) in a way that " the direct and positive linkage of interests of stales where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others in the same direction.

#### First Violation—The plan does not EXPAND economic ties—it only expands diplomatic cooperation

#### “Increase” means to become larger or greater in quantity

Encarta 6 – Encarta Online Dictionary. 2006. ("Increase" http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?refid=1861620741)

in·crease [ in krss ]  
transitive and intransitive verb  (*past and past participle* in·creased, *present participle* in·creas·ing, *3rd person present singular* in·creas·es)Definition**:**make or become larger or greater: to become, or make something become, larger in number, quantity, or degree  
noun  (*plural* in·creas·es)

#### That DECIMATES negative ground—Any AFF could make a cosmetic change to Mexican policy and avoid ALL generic link arguments based off increased economic ties.

#### Second Violation, The plan increases NON-economic ties with Mexico by improving immigration reform

#### It’s a voting issue—Economic engagement is limited to increasing TRADE and FINANCIAL benefits—anything else explodes the topic and undermines preparedness for ALL debates

Haass & O’Sullivan ‘2K. Richard Haass & Meghan O’Sullivan, Senior Fellows @ the Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Studies Program. “Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy.” Pg. 5-6

Architects of engagement strategies have a wide variety of incentives from which to choose. Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans, and economic aid.’2 Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties, whether they be trade embargoes, investment bans, or high tariffs that have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. In addition, facilitated entry into the global economic arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most potent incentives in today’s global market.’ Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to regional or international institutions, or the scheduling of summits between leaders—or the termination of these benefits. Military engagement could involve the extension of International Military Educational Training (IMET) both to strengthen respect for civilian authority and human rights among a country’s armed forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships between Americans and young foreign mffitary officers.’4 These areas of engagement are likely to involve, working with state institutions, while cultural or civil society engagement is likely to entail building people-to-people contacts. Funding nongovernmental organizations, facilitating the flow of remittances, establishing postal and telephone links between the United States and the target country, and promoting the exchange of students, tourists, and other nongovernmental people between the countries are some of the incentives that might be offered under a policy of cultural engagement. This brief overview of the various forms of engagement illuminates the choices open to policymakers. The plethora of options signals the flexibility of engagement as a foreign policy strategy and, in doing so, reveals one of the real strengths of engagement. At the same time, it also suggests the urgent need for considered analysis of this strategy. The purpose of this book is to address this need by deriving insights and lessons from past episodes of engagement and proposing guidelines for the future use of engagement strategies. Throughout the book, two critical questions are entertained. First, when should policymakers consider engagement? A strategy of engagement may serve certain foreign policy objectives better than others. Specific characteristics of a target country may make it more receptive to a strategy of engagement and the incentives offered under it; in other cases, a country's domestic politics may effectively exclude the use of engagement strategies. Second, how should engagement strategies be managed to maximize the chances of success? Shedding light on how policymakers achieved, or failed, in these efforts in the past is critical in an evaluation of engagement strategies. By focusing our analysis, these questions and concerns help produce a framework to guide the use of engagement strategies in the upcoming decades.

Independent reason to reject- **They make the topic bidirectional- they decrease and increase economic engagement by increasing cooperation – mean’s you default to the neg’s interpretation**

### PC Fem

#### Silence about the gendered dimension of economic engagement is an intended tactic and cloaking device that serves to conceal the work of masculine violence.

Chow ’03 (Esther Ngan-ling, Prof. @ American Univ. “Gender Matters: Studying Globalization and Social Change in the 21st Century,” International Sociology 18:3)

Why is globalization as a gendered phenomenon not well recognized? Among many reasons, several are relevant here. First, mainstream discourse focuses on globalization primarily as encompassing macro and disembodied forces, flows and processes in terms of its economic and societal impact. The concept remains at a general, abstract level that has greater meaning and relevance to academicians, journalists and some activists than to the general public, even though people’s everyday lives are very much affected by global forces and happenings. Much of the theorizing about globalization is either gender-neutral or gender-~~blind,~~ ignoring how globalization shapes gender relationships and people’s lives materially, politically, socially and culturally at all levels and treating its differential effects on women and men as similar. Gender is basically taken for granted, as if it does not matter. In particular, women’s voices and lives are virtually absent from much theoretical discussion on globalization. When the gender issue is discussed, the focus tends to be on the effects of globalization on women rather than on the effects of gender on globalization. Some of globalization’s gendered effects are invisible, particularly when its victims, such as poor Third World women, are structurally marginalized, rendering these effects less apparent and less directly observable. How the gender dimension shapes the globalization process is ignored as either unimportant or irrelevant. How gender relations are products of various global–local systems of patriarchy and hegemonic masculinities seldom enters critical debate and discussion. The failure to incorporate gender into the study of globalization in meaningful and systematic ways not only produces incomplete views of women’s rights as fundamental human rights and inaccurate understanding of the sources of gender inequality, but also can actually undermine development policy and practice. In other words, the gender dimension is a critically important missing piece in the theorizing of globalization. Therefore, gender matters for understanding what globalization is and how it is influenced by gendered hierarchies and ideologies, which in turn shape gen\*dered institutions, relationships, identities and experiences of women and men. \*ABLEISM MODIFIED\*\*

#### Framing the world through gendered dualisms orients all policies towards economic growth, effeminizing all alternative discourses as irrational or impossible. This precipitates war, poverty, oppression, and environmental degradation-- making extinction inevitable.

Nhanenge 7

[Jytte Masters @ U South Africa, paper submitted in part fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of master of arts in the subject Development Studies, “ECOFEMINSM: TOWARDS INTEGRATING THE CONCERNS OF WOMEN, POOR PEOPLE AND NATURE INTO DEVELOPMENT]

Generation of wealth was an important part of the Scientific Revolution and its modem society. The scientific discipline of economics therefore became a significant means for wealth creation. However, since it is founded on similar dualised premises as science, also economics became a system of domination and exploitation of women, Others and nature. The following discussion is intended to show that. The way in which economics, with its priority on masculine forces, becomes dominant relates to web-like, inter-connected and complex processes, which are not always clearly perceived. The below discussions try to show how the dualised priority of the individual over society, reason over emotion, self-interest over community-interest, competition over cooperation, and more pairs, generate domination that leads to the four crises of violence and war, poverty, human oppression and environmental degradation. The aim in sum is to show how the current perspective of economics is destroying society (women and Others) and nature. The following discussion is consequently a critique of economics. It is meant to highlight some elements that make economics a dominant ideology, rather than a system of knowledge. It adopts a feministic view and it is therefore seen from the side of women, poor people and nature. The critique is extensive, but not exhaustive. It is extensive because economics is the single most important tool used by mainstream institutions for development in the South. Thus if we want to understand why development does not alleviate poverty, then we first need to comprehend why its main instrument, economics, cannot alleviate poverty. A critical analysis of economics and its influence in development is therefore important as an introduction to next chapter, which discusses ecofeminism and development. However, the critique is not exhaustive because it focuses only on the dualised elements in economics. It is highly likely that there are many more critical issues in economics, which should be analyzed in addition to the below mentioned. However, it would exceed this scope. Each of the following 10 sections discusses a specific issue in economics that relates to its dualised nature. Thus, each can as such be read on its own. However, all sections are systemically interconnected. Therefore each re-enforces the others and integrated, they are meant to show the web of masculine forces that make economics dominant towards women, Others and nature. The first three sections intend to show that economics sees itself as a neutral, objective, quantitative and universal science, which does not need to be integrated in social and natural reality. The outcome of this is, however, that economics cannot value social and environmental needs. Hence, a few individuals become very rich from capitalising on free social and natural resources, while the health of the public and the environment is degraded. It also is shown that the exaggerated focus on monetary wealth does not increase human happiness. It rather leads to a deteriorating quality of life. Thus, the false belief in eternal economic growth may eventually destroy life on planet Earth. The next section shows that economics is based on dualism, with a focus solely on yang forces. This has serious consequences for all yin issues: For example, the priority on individualism over community may in its extreme form lead to self-destruction. Similarly, the priority on rationality while excluding human emotions may end in greed, domination, poverty, violence and war. The next section is important as a means to understanding “rational” economics. Its aim is to clarify the psychological meaning of money. In reality, reason and emotion are interrelated parts of the human mind; they cannot be separated. Thus, economic “rationality” and its focus on eternal wealth generation are based on personal emotions like fears and inadequacies, rather than reason. The false belief in dualism means that human beings are lying to themselves, which results in disturbed minds, stupid actions with disastrous consequences. The focus on masculine forces is consequently psychologically unhealthy; it leads to domination of society and nature, and will eventually destroy the world.

#### Beginning from the subject location of marginalized bodies is the only way to make gendered colonial violence visible. This epistemological privilege doesn't stem from a claim about identity, but rather the position of being most impacted by these policies. Only by centralizing these experiences can we find a roadmap for global restructuring.

Mohanty 03

(Chandra Talpade, She is the women's studies department chair and professor of Women's and Gender Studies, Sociology, and the Cultural Foundations of Education and Dean's Professor of the Humanities at Syracuse University, ““Under Western Eyes” Revisited: Feminist Solidarity

through Anticapitalist Struggles”, Signs, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Winter 2003), pp. 499-535, JSTOR)//SK

This is the very opposite of “special interest” thinking. If we pay attention to and think from the space of some of the most disenfranchised communities of women in the world, we are most likely to envision a just and democratic society capable of treating all its citizens fairly. Conversely, if we begin our analysis from, and limit it to, the space of privileged communities, our visions of justice are more likely to be exclusionary because privilege nurtures blindness to those without the same privileges. Beginning from the lives and interests of marginalized communities of women, I am able to access and make the workings of power visible—to read up the ladder of privilege. It is more necessary to look upward—colonized peoples must know themselves and the colonizer. This particular marginalized location makes the politics of knowledge and the power investments that go along with it visible so that we can then engage in work to transform the use and abuse of power. The analysis draws on the notion of epistemic privilege as it is developed by feminist standpoint theorists (with their roots in the historical materialism of Marx and Lukacs) as well as postpositivist realists, who provide an analysis of experience, identity, and the epistemic effects of social location.15 My view is thus a materialist and “realist” one and is antithetical to that of postmodernist relativism. I believe there are causal links between marginalized social locations and experiences and the ability of human agents to explain and analyze features of capitalist society. Methodologically, this analytic perspective is grounded in historical materialism. My claim is not that all marginalized locations yield crucial knowledge about power and inequity, but that within a tightly integrated capitalist system, the particular standpoint of poor indigenous and Third World/South women provides the most inclusive viewing of systemic power. In numerous cases of environmental racism, for instance, where the neighborhoods of poor communities of color are targeted as new sites for prisons and toxic dumps, it is no coincidence that poor black, Native American, and Latina women provide the leadership in the fight against corporate pollution. Three out of five Afro‐Americans and Latinos live near toxic waste sites, and three of the five largest hazardous waste landfills are in communities with a population that is 80 percent people of color (Pardo 2001, 504–11). Thus, it is precisely their critical reflections on their everyday lives as poor women of color that allows the kind of analysis of the power structure that has led to the many victories in environmental racism struggles.16 Herein lies a lesson for feminist analysis. Feminist scientist Vandana Shiva, one of the most visible leaders of the antiglobalization movement, provides a similar and illuminating critique of the patents and intellectual property rights agreements sanctioned by the World Trade Organization since 1995.17 Along with others in the environmental and indigenous rights movements, she argues that the WTO sanctions biopiracy and engages in intellectual piracy by privileging the claims of corporate commercial interests, based on Western systems of knowledge in agriculture and medicine, to products and innovations derived from indigenous knowledge traditions. Thus, through the definition of Western scientific epistemologies as the only legitimate scientific system, the WTO is able to underwrite corporate patents to indigenous knowledge (as to the Neem tree in India) as their own intellectual property, protected through intellectual property rights agreements. As a result, the patenting of drugs derived from indigenous medicinal systems has now reached massive proportions. I quote Shiva: Through patenting, indigenous knowledge is being pirated in the name of protecting knowledge and preventing piracy. The knowledge of our ancestors, of our peasants about seeds is being claimed as an invention of U.S. corporations and U.S. scientists and patented by them. The only reason something like that can work is because underlying it all is a racist framework that says the knowledge of the Third World and the knowledge of people of color is not knowledge. When that knowledge is taken by white men who have capital, suddenly creativity begins. … Patents are a replay of colonialism, which is now called globalization and free trade. (Shiva, Gordon, and Wing 2000, 32) The contrast between Western scientific systems and indigenous epistemologies and systems of medicine is not the only issue here. It is the colonialist and corporate power to define Western science, and the reliance on capitalist values of private property and profit, as the only normative system that results in the exercise of immense power. Thus indigenous knowledges, which are often communally generated and shared among tribal and peasant women for domestic, local, and public use, are subject to the ideologies of a corporate Western scientific paradigm where intellectual property rights can only be understood in possessive or privatized form. All innovations that happen to be collective, to have occurred over time in forests and farms, are appropriated or excluded. The idea of an intellectual commons where knowledge is collectively gathered and passed on for the benefit of all, not owned privately, is the very opposite of the notion of private property and ownership that is the basis for the WTO property rights agreements. Thus this idea of an intellectual commons among tribal and peasant women actually excludes them from ownership and facilitates corporate biopiracy. Shiva’s analysis of intellectual property rights, biopiracy, and globalization is made possible by its very location in the experiences and epistemologies of peasant and tribal women in India. Beginning from the practices and knowledges of indigenous women, she “reads up” the power structure, all the way to the policies and practices sanctioned by the WTO. This is a very clear example then of a transnational, anticapitalist feminist politics. However, Shiva says less about gender than she could. She is after all talking in particular about women’s work and knowledges anchored in the epistemological experiences of one of the most marginalized communities of women in the world—poor, tribal, and peasant women in India. This is a community of women made invisible and written out of national and international economic calculations. An analysis that pays attention to the everyday experiences of tribal women and the micropolitics of their ultimately anticapitalist struggles illuminates the macropolitics of global restructuring. It suggests the thorough embeddedness of the local and particular with the global and universal, and it suggests the need to conceptualize questions of justice and equity in transborder terms. In other words, this mode of reading envisions a feminism without borders, in that it foregrounds the need for an analysis and vision of solidarity across the enforced privatized intellectual property borders of the WTO. These particular examples offer the most inclusive paradigm for understanding the motivations and effects of globalization as it is crafted by the WTO. Of course, if we were to attempt the same analysis from the epistemological space of Western, corporate interests, it would be impossible to generate an analysis that values indigenous knowledge anchored in communal relationships rather than profit‐based hierarchies. Thus, poor tribal and peasant women, their knowledges and interests, would be invisible in this analytic frame because the very idea of an intellectual commons falls outside the purview of privatized property and profit that is a basis for corporate interests. The obvious issue for a transnational feminism pertains to the visions of profit and justice embodied in these opposing analytic perspectives. The focus on profit versus justice illustrates my earlier point about social location and analytically inclusive methodologies. It is the social location of the tribal women as explicated by Shiva that allows this broad and inclusive focus on justice. Similarly, it is the social location and narrow self‐interest of corporations that privatizes intellectual property rights in the name of profit for elites. Shiva essentially offers a critique of the global privatization of indigenous knowledges. This is a story about the rise of transnational institutions such as the WTO, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, of banking and financial institutions and cross‐national governing bodies like the MAI (Multinational Agreement on Investments). The effects of these governing bodies on poor people around the world have been devastating. In fundamental ways, it is girls and women around the world, especially in the Third World/South, that bear the brunt of globalization. Poor women and girls are the hardest hit by the degradation of environmental conditions, wars, famines, privatization of services and deregulation of governments, the dismantling of welfare states, the restructuring of paid and unpaid work, increasing surveillance and incarceration in prisons, and so on. And this is why a feminism without and beyond borders is necessary to address the injustices of global capitalism. Women and girls are still 70 percent of the world’s poor and the majority of the world’s refugees. Girls and women comprise almost 80 percent of displaced persons of the Third World/South in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Women do two‐thirds of the world's work and earn less than one‐tenth of its income. Women own less than one‐hundredth of the world’s property, while they are the hardest hit by the effects of war, domestic violence, and religious persecution. Feminist political theorist Zillah Eisenstein states that global capital in racialized and sexualized guise destroys the public spaces of democracy and quietly sucks power out of the once social/public spaces of nation‐states. Corporate capitalism has redefined citizens as consumers—and global markets replace the commitments to economic, sexual, and racial equality (Eisenstein 1998, esp. chap. 5). It is especially on the bodies and lives of women and girls from the Third World/South—the Two‐Thirds World—that global capitalism writes its script, and it is by paying attention to and theorizing the experiences of these communities of women and girls that we demystify capitalism as a system of debilitating sexism and racism and envision anticapitalist resistance. Thus any analysis of the effects of globalization needs to centralize the experiences and struggles of these particular communities of women and girls. Drawing on Arif Dirlik’s notion of “place consciousness as the radical other of global capitalism” (1999), Grace Lee Boggs makes an important argument for place‐based civic activism that illustrates how centralizing the struggles of marginalized communities connects to larger antiglobalization struggles. Boggs suggests that “place consciousness … encourages us to come together around common, local experiences and organize around our hopes for the future of our communities and cities. While global capitalism doesn’t give a damn about the people or the natural environment of any particular place because it can always move on to other people and other places, place‐based civic activism is concerned about the health and safety of people and places” (Boggs 2000, 19). Since women are central to the life of neighborhood and communities they assume leadership positions in these struggles. This is evident in the example of women of color in struggles against environmental racism in the United States, as well as in Shiva’s example of tribal women in the struggle against deforestation and for an intellectual commons. It is then the lives, experiences, and struggles of girls and women of the Two‐Thirds World that demystify capitalism in its racial and sexual dimensions—and that provide productive and necessary avenues of theorizing and enacting anticapitalist resistance.

### Iran Politcs

#### Congress pulling punches now - Obama’s investment of capital is key to dissuade hawks and AIPAC

John Hudson, “Despite AIPAC Lobbying, Obama Admin Calms Congress on Iran Talks,” Foreign Policy, 10/23/13

On Wednesday, the Obama administration held its first classified briefing with Congress on its high-stakes nuclear talks with Iran. Despite deep skepticism of White House engagement with Iran -- and despite a fresh lobbying effort by AIPAC -- exiting lawmakers appeared mollified by the State Department's chief nuclear negotiator Wendy Sherman, who led this month's talks with Iran in Geneva. The talks between Iran and six world powers this month offer the Obama administration the chance to solve a key foreign policy goal: Preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon without the use of military force. But many in Congress fear Iran's newly-elected President Hassan Rouhani could be using the talks as a stalling tactic to reach breakout nuclear capacity. Despite those concerns, lawmakers expressed a willingness to give the administration's diplomatic efforts a chance. "All I know is that sanctions seem to be working and that's a positive," Rep. Dutch Ruppersberger (D-MD), ranking member of the Intelligence Committee, told The Cable. "If they weren't working, Iran would not be reaching out at this point." "I appreciate the administration coming up and briefing us on what's going on with the talks," said House Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-VA), who rarely misses a chance to attack the administration's Middle East policies. "I fully support efforts at applying pressure and making sure there is a viable military threat so that perhaps a diplomatic resolution can occur ... I remain concerned about the threat of Iran's actions in terms of pursuing its goal of nuclear capability and will remain involved in oversight of that issue." The meeting was well-attended with members of various House committees, including Intelligence, Foreign Affairs, Appropriations and Financial Services, participating. Several powerful lawmakers whisked out of the classified briefing without speaking to the press, including House Intel chairman Mike Rogers (R-MI), State and Foreign Ops Appropriations Subcommittee chairwoman Kay Granger (R-TX), House Minority Whip Steny Hoyer (D-MD), and House Foreign Affairs chairman Ed Royce (R-CA). The consultations with Congress have coincided with an effort by AIPAC lobbyists to fire them up on the issue. Last week, the pro-Israel group sent a memo to lawmakers insisting that Iran does not have the right to enrich uranium. "The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) does not speak about the right of enrichment," reads the memo, obtained by The Cable from a Congressional aide. "Even if there were such a right, Iran's extensive decades-long violations of the NPT would have negated it." The Rouhani government insists on the right to continue enriching uranium on its own soil, something the White House has hinted it might accept under stringent inspections, but hasn't officially accepted. Tehran has also yet to signal a clear willingness to shutter its underground, heavily-fortified nuclear plant at Qom, a source of particular concern for Israel because it is largely impervious to their air strikes, or to dismantle any of its centrifuges. An AIPAC official would not say how many lawmakers received the memo, but noted that it was also sent to media outlets. In any event, hawks in Congress appear to be pulling their punches, for the most part. (The sole exceptions appear to be Florida Senator Marco Rubio and Illinois Senator Mark Kirk, who want to add sanctions on Iran immediately.) Rep. Eliot Engel, ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and a prominent critic of Iran's nuclear program, said he was "satisfied with the briefing." "I thought it was laid out well," he said, noting that he remains adamant that the U.S. not relent on pressuring Iran until it dismantles its nuclear program. "We all have the same goal. We don't want Iran to have a nuclear weapon. There are various ways you can get there. They laid out some of their thoughts and ideas on it, which I can't share with you, but I certainly do think it's worthwhile talking to the Iranians and seeing if this is real." The next round of Iran talks begin in Geneva on Nov. 7.

#### Economic engagement with Mexico’s politically divisive

**Wilson ‘13**

Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International. Center for Scholars (Christopher E., January, “A U.S.-Mexico Economic Alliance: Policy Options for a Competitive Region,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new\_ideas\_us\_mexico\_relations.pdf)

At a time when Mexico is poised to experience robust economic growth, a manufacturing renaissance is underway in North America and bilateral trade is booming, the United States and Mexico have an important choice to make: sit back and reap the moderate and perhaps temporal benefits coming naturally from the evolving global context , or implement a robust agenda to improve the competitiveness of North America for the long term . Given that job creation and economic growth in both the United States and Mexico are at stake, t he choice should be simple, but a limited understanding about the magnitude, nature and depth of the U.S.-Mexico economic relationship among the public and many policymakers has made serious action to support regional exporters more politically divisive than it ought to be.

#### Agreement on Iranian proliferation solves regional tension, Iranian prolif, and war now – new congressional sanctions crush the fragile momentum

NIAC, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing the interests of the Iranian-American community, “NIAC Applauds US-Iran Diplomatic Progress, Warns Congress Against Sabotaging a Deal,” 10/16/2013. http://www.niacouncil.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=9893

Washington, DC - The National Iranian American Council released the following statement after the conclusion of diplomatic negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran in Geneva:¶ ¶ The National Iranian American Council (NIAC) applauds the U.S. and Iran for engaging in substantive, productive negotiations in Geneva over the past two days. Both Iran and the U.S. and other members of the P5+1 have declared their commitment to reaching a solution that introduces verifiable limits on Iran’s nuclear program and ends the nuclear standoff. Such an agreement is possible and achievable if each side remains committed to the diplomatic track and halts escalatory measures that have prevented diplomatic progress in the past.¶ ¶ Ahead of new negotiations that are scheduled for November 7 and 8, it is critical that the U.S. Congress not interfere. New sanctions legislation would sabotage this promising but fragile process. The Senate must not complicate the talks by tying the hands of the President or undermining confidence that the U.S. can reciprocate in these negotiations. A verifiable agreement to reduce tensions, ensure Iran never develops nuclear weapons, and prevent war is possible if Congress gives diplomacy a chance to succeed. The consideration of new sanctions would undermine a deal. ¶ ¶ The new, positive atmosphere surrounding talks is due, in large part, to a shift in tone and approach from each party. The P5+1, critically, showed flexibility by agreeing to discuss the endgame with Iran, departing from their previous focus on short-term confidence building measures. Each side must continue to focus on a pragmatic approach towards a shared vision for the endgame in order to overcome the deep, long-held mistrust that has fueled escalatory policies. ¶ ¶ Further credit should be given to the injection of political capital into the negotiating process. Direct talks between Kerry and Zarif on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, and the historic phone call between Presidents Obama and Rouhani, have helped to break the taboo of diplomatic contact between the U.S. and Iran. NIAC supports further bilateral discussions between the United States and Iran to continue progress on the nuclear issue, and to address other issues of concern at the earliest possible opportunity, including human rights and regional security.¶ ¶ However, in Congress, Rep. Trent Franks (R-AZ) introduced a war authorization along with 14 other Republicans. In the Senate, the Banking Committee is set to consider new sanctions that passed the House just days before the inauguration of Iran’s new President. If either measure passes, it would reinforce Iranian fears that the United States is really interested in regime change and is unwilling or unable to deliver sanctions relief that is required by any deal. It is time for those in Congress who are serious about preventing war and finding a diplomatic solution to the nuclear standoff to stand up against efforts to sabotage talks and box the U.S. into a military confrontation.

#### Deal prevents global nuclear war

Edelman, distinguished fellow – Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, ‘11

(Eric S, “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran,” *Foreign Affairs*, January/February)

The reports of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and the Commission on the Prevention Of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, as well as other analyses, have highlighted the risk that a nuclear-armed Iran could trigger additional nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, even if Israel does not declare its own nuclear arsenal. Notably, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates— all signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (npt)—have recently announced or initiated nuclear energy programs. Although some of these states have legitimate economic rationales for pursuing nuclear power and although the low-enriched fuel used for power reactors cannot be used in nuclear weapons, these moves have been widely interpreted as hedges against a nuclear-armed Iran. The npt does not bar states from developing the sensitive technology required to produce nuclear fuel on their own, that is, the capability to enrich natural uranium and separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. Yet enrichment and reprocessing can also be used to accumulate weapons-grade enriched uranium and plutonium—the very loophole that Iran has apparently exploited in pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. Developing nuclear weapons remains a slow, expensive, and di⁄cult process, even for states with considerable economic resources, and especially if other nations try to constrain aspiring nuclear states’ access to critical materials and technology. Without external support, it is unlikely that any of these aspirants could develop a nuclear weapons capability within a decade.

There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also oªered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads eªectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This “Islamabad option” could develop in one of several diªerent ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might oªer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the npt since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan’s weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT.

n-player competition

Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multipolar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents’ forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarinebased nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to “launch on warning” of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly,would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war.

### Terror Adv CP

**Text: the President of the United States should call for the creation of a new multilateral counterterrorism organization open to all nations that have ratified and taken necessary steps to implement antiterrorism treaties. The President of the United States should publicly reaffirm support for United Nations counterterrorism efforts and designate a counterterrorism ambassador to the United Nations while reintegrating Security Council counterterrorism obligations to the new council but maintaining the United Nations affiliation with the new council. The Department of State should appoint a diplomatically affiliated head of counterterrorism organizations to oversee United States cooperative counterterrorism efforts.**

**The counterplan solves terrorism and makes hegemony sustainable**

**Millar and Rosand, 07** [Alistair, director at the Center on Global coutnerterroism cooperation, and Eric, Senior Fellow at CGCC; “Building Global Alliances in the Fight Against Terrorism”]

**Call for the Establishment of a Global Anti-Terrorism Organization** The next Administration should call for the establishment of a global anti-terrorism organization under theauspices of the UN. The new White House “Czar” for International Counterterrorism Cooperation shouldlead an inter-agency process within the U.S. government to guarantee that this organization receives supportfrom all the relevant departments, including Homeland Security, State, Justice, Treasury, and Defense. Itshould be made abundantly clear, perhaps in a presidential address to the General Assembly in September 2009, that the new global counterterrorism body will serve the interests of not only the United States, but alsocountries in all parts of the world, and that the nextAdministration intends to work with partners within andoutside of the UN in supporting the creation and the work ofsuch an entity. In addition to overcoming the inter-agency turfbattles among State, Defense, Treasury, Justice, and HomelandSecurity that have characterized U.S. multilateral engagementon counterterrorism issues under the Bush Administration,White House leadership will be needed to overcome theinevitable skepticism from career U.S. governmentcounterterrorism officials regarding the contributions thatmultilateral bodies can make to this global effort.The reasons why the United States would benefit from the creation of an effective global body dedicated to counterterrorism are numerous. **•** It could provide a forum for engaging with traditional and non-traditional allies on a range ofcounterterrorism issues, including those related to countering the growing radicalization andextremism that fuels Islamist terrorism and for which there is currently no broad-based and effective forum. To overcome the stigma attached to its bilateral relations with many Muslim countries, theU.S. could take advantage of such a forum for developing broad-based programs with countriessuch as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Indonesia, and other leading voices in the Muslim world aspart of a multilateral effort to help to overcome the growing skepticism and distrust amongMuslim nations and communities around the globe that the U.S.-led counterterrorism effort istargeting Islam. It could help sustain U.S. engagement in the hard and unglamorous work of counterterrorismwhen the political spotlight fades at home and help sustain international engagement that hasalready waned because of the perception that this has all been about U.S. interests and even U.S.hegemony. **•** It could improve the coordination, cooperation, and information sharing among individual nationsand different multilateral bodies currently engaged in counterterrorism activities and become thefocal point for coordinating international counterterrorism technical assistance efforts, which wouldhelp the international community make better use of the limited funds and expertise available. **•** It could help spread among many countries the capacity building and training burdens that arecurrently subsidized by the United States and a handful of other countries.

**•** It could focus on the urgent task of identifying and correcting vulnerabilities in countries that are¶ not priority countries for the U.S. but which run the risk of becoming terrorist safe havens or breeding grounds for terrorism. • If designed properly, a new global body could not only be able to set international counterterrorism standards for trains, busses and other mass transit systems, where, unlike aviation, international norms on security do not currently exist, but also publicly identify those ¶ countries lacking the political will to comply with these standards. **•** It could also highlight its members’ commitment to upholding the highest standards of human rights and the rule of law while countering terrorism by enunciating a clear set of principles in this area. Such an initiative should be coupled with the closing of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility and a clear statement by the next Administration signaling America’s strong support for these standards. • Finally, a new body could provide a forum for the United States to show its commitment to a multilateral, rule-of-law-based approach to combating terrorism and enable it to work more effectively with traditional and nontraditional allies, conferring greater legitimacy to its counterterrorism efforts and reassuring other countries that the days of American unilateralism in¶ addressing the terrorist threat are a thing of the past.

## 2NC

### CP

**Growth key to hegemony – declining foreign aid and defense spending**

Haass 8

Richard. President of the Council on Foreign Relations. 11/8/8. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122611110847810599.html>.

Pressures to rein in federal spending are sure to grow. There is little that is easy to cut given the need to meet entitlement obligations, pay interest on the $10 trillion debt, and bail out states and cities unable to balance their budgets. What's more, there is an emerging consensus on the need for yet another stimulus package. Down the road, ballooning deficits will bring inflation and cause problems for the dollar. It is highly likely then that Congress will want to cut the defense and foreign-aid budgets simply because there are so few other targets available to reduce federal spending. This will limit the availability of tools central to asserting U.S. power and influence abroad.

**Heg is key to global economic growth**

**Thayer ‘07** [Dr. Bradley A., Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, PHD from U. of Chicago, senior analyst, National Institute for Public Policy “American Empire: A Debate”, Routledge]

Economic prosperity is also a product of the American Empire. It has created a Liberal International Economic Order (LIEO)—a network of worldwide free trade and commerce, respect for intellectual property rights, mobility of capital and labor markets—to promote economic growth. The stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly state in the Third World. The American Empire has created this network not out of altruism but because it benefits the economic well-being of the United States. In 1998, the Secretary of Defense William Cohen put this well when he acknowledged that “economists and soldiers share the same interest in stability”; soldiers create the conditions in which the American economy may thrive, and “we are able to shape the environment [of international politics] in ways that are advantageous to us and are stabilizing to the areas that we are forward deployed, thereby hoping to promote investment and prosperity…business follows the flag.”

**Heg solves nuclear terrorism,**

**Kagan, 07** – Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund (Robert, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Institution, No. 144, August/September, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136)

Throughout all these efforts, whose success is by no means guaranteed and certainly not any time soon, the United States and others will have to persist in fighting what is, in fact, quite accurately called “the war on terrorism.” Now and probably for the coming decades, organized terrorist groups will seek to strike at the United States, and at modernity itself, when and where they can. This war will not and cannot be the totality of America ’s worldwide strategy. It can be only a piece of it. But given the high stakes, it must be prosecuted ruthlessly, effectively, and for as long as the threat persists. This will sometimes require military interventions when, as in Afghanistan, states either cannot or will not deny the terrorists a base. That aspect of the “war on terror” is certainly not going away. One need only contemplate the American popular response should a terrorist group explode a nuclear weapon on American soil. No president of any party or ideological coloration will be able to resist the demands of the American people for retaliation and revenge, and not only against the terrorists but against any nation that aided or harbored them. Nor, one suspects, will the American people disapprove when a president takes preemptive action to forestall such a possibility — assuming the action is not bungled. The United States will not have many eager partners in this fight. For although in the struggle between modernization and tradition, the United States, Russia, China, Europe, and the other great powers are roughly on the same side, the things that divide them from each other — the competing national ambitions and ideological differences — will inevitably blunt their ability or their willingness to cooperate in the military aspects of a fight against radical Islamic terrorism. Europeans have been and will continue to be less than enthusiastic about what they emphatically do not call “the war on terror.” And it will be tempting for Russian and Chinese leaders to enjoy the spectacle of the United States bogged down in a fight with al Qaeda and other violent Islamist groups in the Middle East, just as it is tempting to let American power in that region be checked by a nuclear-armed Iran. Unfortunately, the willingness of the autocrats in Moscow and Beijing to run interference for their fellow autocrats in Pyongyang, Tehran, and Khartoum increases the chance that the connection between terrorists and nuclear weapons will eventually be made.

### DA

#### Impact is Extinction

Toon, chair – Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences – Colorado University, 4/19/’7

(Owen B, climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf)

To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million. Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic consequences. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and terrorists would be most likely to strike there. Accordingly, an organized attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by such a state, could generate casualties comparable to those once predicted for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower conflict. Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to significant global climate perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.

#### Most probable

James A. **Russell,** Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, **‘9** (Spring) “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” IFRI, Proliferation Papers, #26, http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26\_Russell\_2009.pdf

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

#### Iran prolif is a crisis magnifier – draws in great powers to small conflicts

Edelman, Fellow – Center of Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, ‘11

(Eric, “Edelman, Krepinevich, and Montgomery Reply,” *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 9 Iss. 2, March/April)

Ultimately, if Tehran does cross the nuclear threshold and Israel chooses to live with a nuclear-armed Iran, one of the principal objectives of U.S. policy should be convincing Israel to maintain its policy of nuclear opacity for as long as possible. The benefit of a slightly more credible Israeli deterrent would not outweigh the added difficulties the United States would confront in seeking to limit a nuclear Iran's influence, preserve regional stability, and prevent additional proliferation.

A second important issue Adamsky raises is that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons would increase the threat that Israel faced from Iranian proxies such as Hamas and Hezbollah, either because Tehran would provide increased assistance and encouragement to these groups or because they would become more reckless once they had a nuclear-armed patron. A premeditated attack by Iran against Israel is not the only scenario that could lead to a nuclear exchange, or even the most plausible one. Instead, a limited conflict in southern Lebanon or the Gaza Strip might spiral out of control. Iranian proxies could escalate their attacks against Israel, assuming that it would be deterred by its fear of a nuclear Iran. Israel could then defy their expectations and conduct major reprisals to demonstrate its resolve, prompting Iran to make nuclear threats in defense of its clients. The results would be unpredictable and potentially disastrous. Although debates over Iran's nuclear program often turn on the issue of Iranian "rationality," it is important to remember that there are many different paths to conflict, and the dynamics of Iranian-Israeli relations could be prone to miscalculation and escalation.

#### Iranian proliferation escalates into global nuclear war

Kroenig 12

[Matthew, assistant professor in the Department of Government at Georgetown University and a research affiliate with The Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University, he served as a strategist on the policy planning staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense where he received the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Award for Outstanding Achievement. He is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations and has held academic fellowships from the National Science Foundation, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California, “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future?” <http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1182&rtid=2>], accessed 6/5/13,WYO/JF

Regional instability: The spread of nuclear weapons also emboldens nuclear powers contributing to regional instability. States that lack nuclear weapons need to fear direct military attack from other states, but states with nuclear weapons can be confident that they can deter an intentional military attack, giving them an incentive to be more aggressive in the conduct of their foreign policy. In this way, nuclear weapons provide a shield under which states can feel free to engage in lower-level aggression. Indeed, international relations theories about the “stability-instability paradox” maintain that stability at the nuclear level contributes to conventional instability.[[64]](http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1182&rtid=2" \l "_ftn64" \o ")¶ Historically, we have seen that the spread of nuclear weapons has emboldened their possessors and contributed to regional instability. Recent scholarly analyses have demonstrated that, after controlling for other relevant factors, nuclear-weapon states are more likely to engage in conflict than nonnuclear-weapon states and that this aggressiveness is more pronounced in new nuclear states that have less experience with nuclear diplomacy.[[65]](http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1182&rtid=2" \l "_ftn65" \o ") Similarly, research on internal decision-making in Pakistan reveals that Pakistani foreign policymakers may have been emboldened by the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which encouraged them to initiate militarized disputes against India.[[66]](http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1182&rtid=2" \l "_ftn66" \o ") ¶ Currently, Iran restrains its foreign policy because it fears a major military retaliation from the United States or Israel, but with nuclear weapons it could feel free to push harder. A nuclear-armed Iran would likely step up support to terrorist and proxy groups and engage in more aggressive coercive diplomacy. With a nuclear-armed Iran increasingly throwing its weight around in the region, we could witness an even more crisis prone Middle East. And in a poly-nuclear Middle East with Israel, Iran, and, in the future, possibly other states, armed with nuclear weapons, any one of those crises could result in a catastrophic nuclear exchange.¶ Nuclear proliferation can also lead to regional instability due to preventive strikes against nuclear programs. States often conduct preventive military strikes to prevent adversaries from acquiring nuclear weapons. Historically, the United States attacked German nuclear facilities during World War II, Israel bombed a nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981, Iraq bombed Iran’s Bushehr reactors in the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s and Iran returned the favor against an Iraqi nuclear plant, a U.S.-led international coalition destroyed Iraq’s nuclear infrastructure in the first Gulf War in 1991, and Israel bombed a Syrian nuclear reactor in 2007. These strikes have not led to extensive conflagrations in the past, but we might not be so lucky in the future. At the time of writing in 2012, the United States and Israel were polishing military plans to attack Iran’s nuclear program and some experts maintain that such a strike could very well lead to a wider war in the Middle East.

**Iranian prolif causes nuclear terrorism: facility dispersion risks terrorist theft, and no centralized control risks deliberate transfers to terrorists**

**Sagan in ‘7**

[Scott, Professor, Wishes he was Kenneth Waltz, "A Nuclear Iran: Promoting Stability or Courting Disaster", Journal of International Affairs, Summer, p. asp ]

First, the stability-instability paradox--that is, the possibility that individual countries would be more aggressive with nuclear capability If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, will it behave more aggressively in the Middle East? On the one hand, we have a good insight from Professor Waltz: The United States would be more reluctant to attack Iran if it had nuclear weapons, and indeed I do believe that's why Iran is so interested. On the other hand, however, we have the possibility that various Iranians--especially those in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps--may feel that it is safer for them to probe--to attack Americans in Iraq, to attack military bases in the region, to support terrorist attacks elsewhere. Therefore it is not at all clear what might be the final outcome. More probing attacks? More provocation? Indeed, this is the worry with regard to the Iran crisis today. I don't believe the Bush administration wants to attack. But I do think there are some factions in Iran who wouldn't mind a potential attack from the United States because it would increase support for the regime. It's possible that these factions in Iran will actually increase rather than decrease attacks by Iranian agents in Iraq against American forces to force our hand. The second problem--terrorist theft. The Iranians, in trying to reduce the likelihood of an attack against their nuclear development sites, are dispersing **those** sites **in the countryside.** But such measures will increase the likelihood that there won't be central control **over their nuclear program**, and increase the likelihood that, if they do develop nuclear weapons, insiders and terrorist groups could potentially seize them. Finally, the question of ambiguous control. Here we must ask: Who controls the weapons and materials? They don't yet have weapons in Iran, but they are working to get them. And it is not the professional Iranian military but the Revolutionary Guard **Corps** guarding the development sites **whose own financial units have often been those used to purchase different parts of the program. These are the same individuals running the arms supply operations to terrorist organizations that Iran supports.** To have your nuclear guardians and your terrorist supporter organizations be one and the same is a recipe for disaster.

**Terrorist Attacks Devastate Global Economy**

**International Review**, 1/29/**02**, “Economic Costs of Terrorism” (<http://www.int-review.org/terr25a.html>)

For days, terrorist concerns grounded all civilian aviation, shut down the stock market and disrupted transportation throughout the country. A possible forecasted U.S. recession will reverberate throughout the world. World Bank President James Wolfensohn believes the terrorist attacks will cut global economic growth by up to 1 percent in 2002. **Terror Attack on Global Economic Progress** The repercussions trickle down through every layer of the global economy. In the era of globalization, the September 11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington have had worldwide economic consequences, felt even in those countries that are not likely to become terrorist targets themselves. Ultimately, some of the weakest Third World economies could suffer the worst fallout from the September attacks. The necessary preoccupation with counter-terrorism measures is also diverting attention and resources away from economic development throughout the world. The Group of Seven (G-7) top industrial countries is concerned about panic in the banking sector. On September 13, the U.S. Federal Reserve made US$50 billion available to stabilize European banking systems. Many G-7 central banks have cut interest rates to boost consumer confidence and funnel more money into the ailing global economy. **Macro-Economic Realities** The U.S. Treasury concedes that a recession may well result from the September 11 horrors. A decline in gross domestic product is likely to continue into at least the first quarter of 2002. Before September 11, U.S. gross domestic product was expected to increase by 2 percent in the fourth quarter of 2001. In the days following the attacks in New York and Washington, U.S. employers cut more than 248,000 jobs. The transportation sector was especially hard hit, with more than 96,000 lay-offs. The attacks have also curbed consumer spending, which normally accounts for about two thirds of U.S. economic activity.

#### Deal breakdown causes middle east war

Mark Leonard, Reuters, “On Iran, Obama's bigger challenge is with his allies,” 10/15/2013.

With the possibility of bilateral meetings between the U.S. and Iran in Geneva, and supported by the U.S.-Russian deal on chemical weapons in Syria, there is a tantalizing prospect that the Iranian regime could become a partner to the U.S., rather than a rival. It is too early to know if Iranian President Hassan Rouhani is able to deliver, but as diplomats gather in Geneva for U.N. talks, it is not hard to see why President Obama would invest so much hope in a deal. A former Democratic congressman who knows Obama well explained to me that, like healthcare on the domestic front, it would be a bold, game-changing initiative. And, like healthcare, an alliance with Iran eluded President Bill Clinton. Obama recognizes that there is the danger of a full-blown regional sectarian conflict in the Middle East. If diplomacy fails with Iran, Obama could find himself remembered as the president who took the United States into two new Middle East Wars — in Iran and Syria — rather than the one who ended two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

#### Global nuclear war

John **Steinbach**, DC Iraq Coalition, Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Threat to Peace, March 20**02**, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2002/03/00\_steinbach\_israeli-wmd.htm, accessed 4/19/04.

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for whatever reason - the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)

#### Political will key

Michael Martinez, 9/20/2013 (staff writer, “Iran's president begins 'charm offensive,' but will Obama buy it?” <http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/20/world/us-iran-relations/>, Accessed 10/16/2013, rwg)

To keep hard-liners at bay, Rouhani now must deliver something -- namely, economic relief as Iran strains under global sanctions -- or his critics will prevail as they did against Obama in 2009 when his own venture on U.S.-Iran diplomacy foundered, one analyst said.¶ "Now the roles are reversed: Rouhani needs to strike a deal quickly," said Trita Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council who's authored "A Single Roll of the Dice: Obama's Diplomacy with Iran."¶ Next week's U.N. General Assembly meeting "could be quite decisive," Parsi said.¶ "That's going to be the moment where the two sides have to invest the political capital needed. Otherwise it will go nowhere. It's going to be costly politically to strike a deal. There's going to be critics on both sides," Parsi said. "There is a need for a huge dose of political will to be injected into the process."¶ But Elliott Abrams, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, said Obama shouldn't meet with Rouhani during the U.N. gathering, though shaking hands in a corridor would be appropriate.

#### PC theory true- empirics prove deal-making matters- Klein is overly pessimistic

Mandel 3/23 (Seth, Assistant Editor of Commentary magazine, <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2012/03/23/presidential-persuasion-commander-in-chief-obama-reagan-clinton/>)

I want to offer Klein one more note of optimism. He writes: Back-room bargains and quiet negotiations do not, however, present an inspiring vision of the Presidency. And they fail, too. Boehner and Obama spent much of last summer sitting in a room together, but, ultimately, the Speaker didn’t make a private deal with the President for the same reason that Republican legislators don’t swoon over a public speech by him: he is the leader of the Democratic Party, and if he wins they lose. This suggests that, as the two parties become more sharply divided, it may become increasingly difficult for a President to govern—and there’s little that he can do about it. I disagree. The details of the deal matter, not just the party lines about the dispute. There is no way the backroom negotiations Clinton conducted with Gingrich over social security reform could have been possible if we had prime ministers, instead of presidents. The president possesses political capital Congress doesn’t. History tells us there are effective ways to use that capital. One lesson: quiet action on domestic policy, visible and audible leadership on national security.

## 1NR

### Terror

**No terrorism – hard to pull off, not many terrorists, and small attacks don’t cut it**

**Schneier** **5/5** - masters degree in computer science from American University, chief technology officer and founder of BT Counterpane Internet Security (Bruce, “Why Aren't There More Terrorist Attacks?”, Schneier on Security, May 5th, <http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/05/why_arent_there.html>)

As the details of the Times Square car bomb attempt emerge in the wake of Faisal Shahzad's arrest Monday night, one thing has already been made clear: Terrorism is fairly easy. All you need is a gun or a bomb, and a crowded target. Guns are easy to buy. Bombs are easy to make. Crowded targets -- not only in New York, but all over the country -- are easy to come by. If you're willing to die in the aftermath of your attack, you could launch a pretty effective terrorist attack with a few days of planning, maybe less. But if it's so easy, why aren't there more terrorist attacks like the failed car bomb in New York's Times Square? Or the terrorist shootings in Mumbai? Or the Moscow subway bombings? After the enormous horror and tragedy of 9/11, why have the past eight years been so safe in the U.S.? There are actually several answers to this question. One, terrorist attacks are harder to pull off than popular imagination -- and the movies -- lead everyone to believe. Two, there are far fewer terrorists than the political rhetoric of the past eight years leads everyone to believe. And three, random minor terrorist attacks don't serve Islamic terrorists' interests right now. Hard to Pull Off Terrorism sounds easy, but the actual attack is the easiest part. Putting together the people, the plot and the materials is hard. It's hard to sneak terrorists into the U.S. It's hard to grow your own inside the U.S. It's hard to operate; the general population, even the Muslim population, is against you. Movies and television make terrorist plots look easier than they are. It's hard to hold conspiracies together. It's easy to make a mistake. Even 9/11, which was planned before the climate of fear that event engendered, just barely succeeded. Today, it's much harder to pull something like that off without slipping up and getting arrested. Few Terrorists But even more important than the difficulty of executing a terrorist attack, there aren't a lot of terrorists out there. Al-Qaida isn't a well-organized global organization with movie-plot-villain capabilities; it's a loose collection of people using the same name. Despite the post-9/11 rhetoric, there isn't a terrorist cell in every major city. If you think about the major terrorist plots we've foiled in the U.S. -- the JFK bombers, the Fort Dix plotters -- they were mostly amateur terrorist wannabes with no connection to any sort of al-Qaida central command, and mostly no ability to effectively carry out the attacks they planned. The successful terrorist attacks -- the Fort Hood shooter, the guy who flew his plane into the Austin IRS office, the anthrax mailer -- were largely nut cases operating alone. Even the unsuccessful shoe bomber, and the equally unsuccessful Christmas Day underwear bomber, had minimal organized help -- and that help originated outside the U.S. Terrorism doesn't occur without terrorists, and they are far rarer than popular opinion would have it. Small Attacks Aren't Enough Lastly, and perhaps most subtly, there's not a lot of value in unspectacular terrorism anymore. If you think about it, terrorism is essentially a PR stunt. The death of innocents and the destruction of property isn't the goal of terrorism; it's just the tactic used. And acts of terrorism are intended for two audiences: for the victims, who are supposed to be terrorized as a result, and for the allies and potential allies of the terrorists, who are supposed to give them more funding and generally support their efforts. An act of terrorism that doesn't instill terror in the target population is a failure, even if people die. And an act of terrorism that doesn't impress the terrorists' allies is not very effective, either. Fortunately for us and unfortunately for the terrorists, 9/11 upped the stakes. It's no longer enough to blow up something like the Oklahoma City Federal Building. Terrorists need to blow up airplanes or the Brooklyn Bridge or the Sears Tower or JFK airport -- something big to impress the folks back home. Small no-name targets just don't cut it anymore. Note that this is very different than terrorism by an occupied population: the IRA in Northern Ireland, Iraqis in Iraq, Palestinians in Israel. Setting aside the actual politics, all of these terrorists believe they are repelling foreign invaders. That's not the situation here in the U.S. So, to sum up: If you're just a loner wannabe who wants to go out with a bang, terrorism is easy. You're more likely to get caught if you take a long time to plan or involve a bunch of people, but you might succeed. If you're a representative of al-Qaida trying to make a statement in the U.S., it's much harder. You just don't have the people, and you're probably going to slip up and get caught.

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#### It’s imperative to tow the line: Definitional precision is a precondition for educational, policy-relevant debates about “engagement”.

Resnick 1 — Evan Resnick, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Columbia University, holds an M.Phil. in Political Science and an M.A. in Political Science from Columbia University, 2001 (“Defining engagement,” *Journal of International Affairs*, Volume 54, Issue 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via ABI/INFORM Complete)

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.

#### Our interpretation allows sufficient Aff flexibility

Bayne 7 – Sir Nicholas Bayne, Fellow at the International Trade Policy Unit of the London School of Economics, and Stephen Woolcock, Lecturer in International Relations at The London School of Economics, The New Economic Diplomacy: Decision-making and Negotiation in International Economic Relations, p. 4

Economic diplomacy is best defined not by its instruments but by the economic *issues* that provide its content. We follow the same categories as used by Odell in determining the scope of economic negotiation: 'policies relating to production, movement or exchange of goods, services, investments (including official development assistance), money, information and their regulation’ (Odell 2000. 11). This is a very wide range of issues. A single volume could not cover them all and, of necessity, this book is selective. It concentrates on the central issues of trade, finance, energy and the global environment. These are topics of high political profile, which arouse strong popular concern and bring out well the interplay between different actors in economic diplomacy

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